Finally, more than 100 days after the start of the U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, Trump has announced his decision to shift from maritime to land attacks. The initial targets, he stated, are in Venezuela, although he also threatened Colombia and any country that produces or traffics drugs. “We’re taking those sons of a bitches out,” he declared, giving his statement the thuggish tone that has become his trademark. And so the crisis reached its highest point of tension. The question is no longer what will happen, but when and how. But, even as a rhetorical exercise, it is still worth asking whether military action against Venezuela and other Latin American countries — whether with troops or surgical strikes — is truly inevitable.
Over the past week, Trump has been dropping hints to let the public know that his administration has made contact with the Nicolás Maduro regime. First, he said he would speak with him; then he revealed that he already had, but downplayed the fact, saying it was just a phone call. However, Reuters reported on Monday night that the conversation took place on November 21 and lasted 15 minutes. The details: Maduro presented a list of demands for stepping down, including a broad amnesty for himself and about 100 of his cronies, as well as an interim government headed by current Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. Trump agreed to allow him and his family to leave the country and gave him a verbal ultimatum to leave Venezuela by November 28, which he failed to do. But he rejected everything else, since defining what can or cannot be granted to Maduro is not within his purview.
What matters is that, from that phone call, Trump’s subsequent statements, and recent developments, five key points emerge that show why the conflict has entered its most critical and dangerous phase yet.
1. A personalized conflict
The power struggle has centered on the two top figures of each government. Despite his recent threats, by downplaying the call, Trump sent a message aimed more at Maduro than at the U.S. public: the channel of negotiation remains open without implying immediate military action, but within a framework of maximum pressure. In chess terms, Trump has essentially put Maduro in check without guaranteeing checkmate. Despite the enormous power imbalance between the two countries, this situation favors Maduro, even though Trump is the one running the clock. As José de Córdoba explained in The Wall Street Journal, at the end of this head-to-head battle, one president will have won and another will have lost. And we know that Trump doesn’t like to lose.
2. The real objective: regime change and controlling the ‘backyard’
Beneath the guise of anti-drug efforts and protecting the U.S. population, Washington’s structural objective is to spark regime change and a transition aligned with the Venezuelan opposition loyal to María Corina Machado. It is, simultaneously, an attempt at geopolitical repositioning by the United States to justify its hegemonic control of its “backyard” — that “little region over here,” as Henry L. Stimson, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of war, called it in 1945. Venezuela operates here as a resource-country: political control, access to strategic assets, and the capacity to project influence vis-à-vis other global actors.
3. War of narratives and fading credibility of the anti-drug message
Since the beginning of the U.S. naval deployment, the accusation that Maduro leads the Cartel of the Suns has been questioned by experts and media, who see it as pretext promoted by Venezuelan opposition members in Washington to facilitate military action.
The recent pardon of Juan Orlando Hernández, the former president of Honduras sentenced to 45 years in prison for collaborating in the shipment of 500 tons of cocaine to the United States, has further undermined the anti-drug narrative, highlighting Trump’s double standards. This strategic contradiction — or blatant inconsistency? — erodes his position at a time when his bombings in the Caribbean face growing opposition from Democrats and Republicans in Congress, segments of the MAGA movement, and the general public.
Two facts are worth highlighting. Only one in five Americans has heard enough about the military deployment in the Caribbean, while 70% of the population would oppose military action. This opposition stems from concerns about violations of international law and potential war crimes associated with the bombing of vessels allegedly carrying drugs. All of this increases the political cost of decisive action just as Trump’s approval ratings are hitting historic lows. By extension, the Venezuelan opposition led by María Corina Machado — which staked its moral and strategic case against Maduro on that narrative but has failed to explain or “sell” it to Americans — is also suffering severe political damage.
4. Media ecosystem and limitations of the US-centric approach
Coverage by media outlets such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, and The Guardian has generated harsh criticism among Venezuelans, who accuse them of “manufacturing a consensus” in favor of Maduro. Although no such campaign exists, there may be anti-Trump biases of varying intensity.
Venezuelans’ frustration is understandable, because this perspective narrows the understanding of the country’s reality: it produces narratives framed from Washington rather than from events on the ground. But it should be recognized rather that we Venezuelans are an interested party, which influences our perception of bias in reports by the mainstream media.
These articles reflect the perspectives of experts and academics who dominate analysis on Venezuela. They reflect professional inertia and editorial agendas geared toward what interests the American professional class, without capturing how Venezuelan society is being strangled by the regime. This reporting overlooks the depth of Chavista corruption and repression, the complicity between its inner circle (Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, Vladimir Padrino López) and criminal networks, Colombian narco-guerrillas, and groups like Hezbollah. This fuels misunderstandings and frustration among opposition members and citizens who yearn for real change.
5. Stalled fleet and the “check without checkmate” strategy
Returning to the fleet: today it symbolizes a frozen check and, for Venezuelans, an interminable wait. The lack of resolution has given Maduro time to promote an epic anti-imperialist narrative, organize his regime’s forces, and improve his negotiating position, while increasing the strain on Trump and a Venezuelan opposition desperate for tangible results. Although Trump has executive power and has demonstrated his willingness to act even outside the legal framework — in fact, he could do so at any moment — he is also moving in a context filled with international crises: the Russia-Ukraine war, global tensions over his tariff policies, a fragile ceasefire in Gaza, and internal resistance to his authoritarian impulses. All of this conditions any decision regarding Venezuela. In this context, isolating the regime will hardly produce a resolution on its own. Without a more decisive gesture from the United States, Maduro will continue to buy time and interpret Trump’s threats as part of the bluffing that characterizes him.
The corollary of this scenario: inaction becomes an action with its own consequences: it perpetuates the crisis, erodes U.S. credibility, and leaves the Venezuelan opposition trapped between expectation and frustration. It is difficult to recommend actions in this context, but if Washington is unclear about its next move, it should take a series of steps. First, assess incentives that would lead to Maduro’s departure and reduce the possibility of armed resistance from Chavismo and its criminal partners in the event of a military intervention. Second, anticipate the human cost of military action, strengthen domestic political support, and avoid mere posturing. Third, bolster non-military alternatives without abandoning military deterrence. In short, avoid mistakes that could prove very costly.
As these factors interact and generate new scenarios that could have unforeseen effects, in Venezuela, narratives about regime change and transition are divided into three groups. First, those who believe that Machado can lead the country to a democratic government under a kind of Trumpian protectorate. Second, the doomsayers who believe that Maduro’s departure would usher in a new era of violence and anarchy, as if Maduro, however much they detest him, were a necessary evil containing even greater chaos. And finally, those who view both narratives with reservations but consider Maduro an illegitimate and corrupt ruler who must leave power as soon as possible. They know that any transition can be turbulent. They know that aligning with Trump carries the enormous risk of entering into a Faustian bargain. But they trust in the majority of Venezuelans’ desire to restore their democracy and peacefully rebuild their future after a quarter-century of Chavista misrule.
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