In the space of just three years, Kim Ju-ae, the teenaged daughter of Kim Jong-un, has gone from complete obscurity to being an increasingly frequent presence alongside North Korea’s supreme leader. She is the only known member, so far, of the fourth generation of the dynasty that has ruled the world’s most isolated country with an iron fist since 1948. Pyongyang revealed her existence in 2022, but has not confirmed her name or age. There is no public biography, nor any verifiable information about her life. What little is known about her comes from images carefully selected by the North Korean regime and the interpretations these have generated outside the country’s borders. Her growing prominence at key events has made her the most intriguing figure within the North Korean power structure.
On February 12, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) informed a group of South Korean lawmakers that it has found evidence suggesting Ju-ae is close to being designated as the next North Korean leader. Since January 2024, the NIS had maintained that Ju-ae was “the most likely successor” and that she was “being trained” for a possible transition. The new assessment, however, indicates that the process may have entered a much more concrete phase, as, according to the intelligence service, there is evidence that could be interpreted as Ju-ae expressing her opinion on certain state policies and, in practice, being treated as the regime’s second-in-command.
Succession in North Korea — similar to that of a hereditary monarchy — is nevertheless an extremely opaque matter. The first time state media published a photo of the current leader, Kim Jong-un, and his siblings Kim Yo-jong and Kim Jong-chul was in 2009. Then in their twenties, none of the three were explicitly named.
Ju-ae’s public debut occurred on the most symbolically charged stage for Pyongyang: a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in November 2022. The image of a girl accompanying Kim to the inspection of what was later confirmed to be the most powerful missile in the North Korean arsenal at that time, the Hwasong-17, introduced an element previously absent from the official narrative: confirmation that the North Korean leader had offspring.
The renowned South Korean academic Sung-Yoon Lee dedicates several passages to Ju-ae in his book, The Little Sister, which focuses on the figure of Kim Jo-yong, the sinister sibling of Kim Jong-un, whom he considers the most powerful woman in North Korea. Written in 2024, Lee recalls Ju-ae’s first appearance, when she was approximately 10 years old, “at an event as family-oriented as the launch of a powerful intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching any point on the continental United States.”
In the photos, the girl bore a striking resemblance to her mother, Ri Sol-ju, and also to her father. Eight days later, North Korea released more images, showing her dressed and made up in her mother’s style.
That public appearance, the academic writes, led some observers to predict that she had already been chosen as successor. Lee is not so sure: “In fact, it is possible that Kim brought his daughter to the spectacle simply to gloat over the democratically elected leaders in Washington and Seoul, who are subject to term limits. She symbolizes that his power, unlike theirs, is for life and, in due course, will pass to one of his children.”
The staging was designed, he adds, to immediately associate the continuity of the lineage with nuclear deterrence. “Kim must have thought that juxtaposing a powerful missile capable of reaching the United States with nuclear warheads and a healthy father-daughter relationship could sow a resigned acceptance of his nuclear weapons in the subconscious of his adversaries.”
However, Lee believes that even though Kim has apparently decided his daughter is his most suitable successor, it will be some time before she comes of age. At least until 2030, Yo-jong will be “the sole heir to the throne” or perhaps the regent, until one of his nieces or nephews assumes power.
Information about Ju-ae — like everything else related to North Korea — is extremely scarce. It was Dennis Rodman, the former NBA star, who revealed in 2013 that Kim had a daughter named Ju-ae and that he had allowed him to hold her during a visit to the country. But it’s not even certain that this is her name.
State media began describing her in 2022 as the leader’s “most beloved” or “precious” daughter, but have never revealed her identity. According to unconfirmed assessments from Seoul, Ju-ae is the middle of three siblings, estimated to be around 16, 13, and nine years old. In 2023, the state-run press went a step further by referring to her as hyangdo, which can be translated as “guide” or “guiding leader,” a designation historically reserved for figures with ideological or political authority within the system.
Hyunseung Lee, a former member of the North Korean Workers’ Party and elite, claims that her real first name could be “Ju-un,” a combination of the second character of each of his parents’ given names (Ri Sol-ju and Kim Jong-un), and that “Ju-ae” could simply be a term of endearment.
Most of Ju-ae’s early public appearances were linked to defense and weapons development events, central pillars of the regime’s legitimacy. In 2023, she attended the parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, one of the main military showcases on the political calendar, and the launch of the Hwasong-18, the country’s first solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, which Pyongyang presented as a qualitative leap in its strategic capabilities. She has also been seen at the unveiling of new weapons systems and on visits to military-related facilities, further solidifying her symbolic association with national security.
Over time, her exposure has expanded to other areas. In 2025, she was present at events related to economic projects (such as the inauguration of several tourist resorts), and she was even part of the delegation that accompanied Kim to Beijing during his official visit to the Asian giant.
That trip added a foreign policy dimension to Ju-ae’s public image and was interpreted as a message that transcended North Korean borders: when Kim Jong-il visited the Chinese capital in 2010, he did so alongside his son Kim Jong-un, who would be publicly promoted within the Party and the Army a few months later. In 2011, he would ultimately assume power after his father’s sudden death. Kim Jong-il took years to define who his successor would be, and for a long time it was considered to be his eldest son, Kim Jong-nam, who fell out of favor in the early 2000s.
Ramón Pacheco-Pardo, a professor of international relations at King’s College London specializing in Korea, believes that Kim Jong-un is seeking to replicate the succession model of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, founder of North Korea and of the “Mount Paektu lineage,” as his direct descendants call themselves. In 1974, when his son Kim Jong-il was just over 30 years old, he was internally designated as the likely heir. In 1980, he was formally declared successor during the Sixth Party Congress. By then, he had amassed enormous power. The media did not report one of his speeches until 1992: “Glory to the heroic soldiers of the Korean People’s Army!” he exhorted the troops at a parade, already as supreme commander of the armed forces.
His final coronation as supreme leader would not come until 1994, after his father’s death. Sung-Yoon Lee aptly summarizes the pattern of his years awaiting the throne: “After the end of the [Korean] war in 1953, Kim Jong-il lived the pampered life of a prince and, subsequently, from his early thirties onward, the authoritarian and unrivaled life of a designated heir.”
Not all observers believe Kim’s daughter will be the successor. “Although Ju-ae is honored and respected in every way, my personal opinion is that this is a distraction or a decoy,” says Chun In-bum, a retired three-star South Korean general turned analyst. He believes this is the case, among other reasons, because of the “limited” social status of women in North Korean society, and because Kim Jong-un has the capacity to maintain a “harem” of women, and therefore numerous children: he himself is the product of one of his father’s many partners. He also doesn’t consider it a country open to change: “North Korea cannot change because it would mean the end of the Kim family,” he tells EL PAÍS via text message.
Pacheco-Pardo adds, however, that Ju-ae’s esthetic, disseminated through a carefully curated propaganda system, “reflects a certain elegance and modernity within North Korean standards.” Her clothing and hairstyle, different from those of most teenagers her age, show “that she belongs to the wealthiest class in the country.”
The Ninth Party Congress is scheduled for the end of the month, and South Korean intelligence services have indicated they will be closely monitoring whether Ju-ae attends and, especially, whether she receives an official title or specific protocol treatment that reveals her designation as successor. Every detail could be laden with symbolism. However, as is often the case with the secretive nuclear nation, it is most likely that everything will remain shrouded in mystery.
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