Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar this week unveiled the first phase of his offensive against the system of power built over 16 years by Viktor Orbán. The process, which will take months, has been dubbed Operation Cleansing Fire. In its initial phase, the government of Magyar’s Respect and Freedom Party, commonly known by its Hungarian abbreviations as Tisza, will pursue a constitutional reform that would allow for the removal of President Tamás Sulyok and other senior officials loyal to Orbán, as well as the creation of an office to recover state assets. After the summer, a constituent process will begin, including the drafting of a new constitution and an overhaul of the electoral system.
Magyar began the week with an hour-long address to the Hungarian Parliament in which he declared that his main mission is “to free our country from the economic and political mafia.” The conservative prime minister compared the power network established by his predecessor to organized crime in Italy and explicitly referenced the killings of judges and prosecutors who investigated the mafia in the 1990s. Hungary, he said, needs the same kind of firm hand that the Italian government used at the time.
The government’s most urgent task is to recover EU funds frozen by Brussels over Orbán’s democratic backsliding, before certain deadlines expire in August. Backed by the supermajority and mandate he secured in the April elections, Magyar has set the legislative machinery in motion, with an anti-corruption package and a constitutional amendment. The 17th amendment to the fundamental law — written by Orbán and revised to suit his needs 16 times — is being put to public consultation until Saturday, ahead of approval in the coming days.
According to Tisza, the aim is to establish “those rules that are essential for the functioning of a democracy based on the rule of law” ahead of the constituent process it plans to launch in September. Some of the procedures and the rush to implement them have drawn criticism from segments of Hungarian civil society.
One of the government’s priorities is to remove Sulyok, who refused Magyar’s pressure to resign. The new leader regards him as a puppet who has acted in the service of Orbán’s government rather than the Hungarian people, and says a new president will be in place before August 20.
Removing a head of state, however, is a far-reaching decision with no precedent. Hungary’s case could become a reference point for other countries, as Márta Pardavi, co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee — one of the most active organizations defending the rule of law — explains by phone.
“Hungary has to do this right,” Pardavi says. The exceptional nature of the moment — “to achieve the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law” — and Sulyok’s record — “who failed to fulfil his constitutional duties” — justify the removal, the expert believes. The organization nevertheless urges the government to explain it more clearly in the text of the constitutional amendment.
Amnesty International also agrees that Sulyok should step down, but Áron Demeter, the organization’s campaign director, rejects the idea that the removal should take place by “simply inserting a phrase into a constitutional amendment.”
“The current constitution already provides for an impeachment procedure that, in our view, could be activated,” Demeter explains. The Magyar government, he adds, “has the responsibility not only to be effective or to get rid of him, but also to try to do so in a way that guarantees the maximum procedural rights and the fairest possible procedure.”
That stance has earned the organization a torrent of criticism on social media. “The general feeling, at least among Tisza’s supporters, is: ‘We don’t care how you get rid of all those people; just do it.’ They don’t care about the method, but we do,” Demeter stresses.
Beyond Sulyok’s removal, the proposed reform provides for the dismissal of other senior officials, including judges — another highly sensitive issue. The amendment restores the retirement age of 70 for Constitutional Court judges — a measure that will open up several vacancies — and expands the court’s powers. It also stipulates that, to strengthen judicial independence, judges should elect the presidents of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the body that oversees the judiciary.
Nearly 280 legal experts — academics, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and researchers — argue in an open letter that these officials “played a significant role in the establishment and maintenance of the autocratic regime” and that, due to their decisions and abuses, “they have irreparably lost their credibility.” Keeping them in place would hinder the restoration of the rule of law, they maintain, but they warn that changes must be carried out with caution, avoiding “manipulative” solutions and ensuring transparent procedures that allow for the selection of people who are “credible, impartial, and capable.”
After limiting prime ministers’ terms to two legislatures — to ensure that Orbán cannot be re-elected and that no one can entrench themselves in power as he did — Tisza also proposes in this constitutional amendment that members of parliament be restricted to serving no more than three terms.
“This was neither an urgent measure nor one of the promises made to his electorate; there should be a broad debate on initiatives like this,” Pardavi says.
The expert also criticizes the fact that the amendment was open for public consultation for only five days, and that a major anti-corruption legislative package submitted to Parliament two weeks ago was not even subject to that process. “It is 110 pages of legislation introduced by a single deputy and processed in a rushed manner. That’s very reminiscent of the methods of Fidesz [Orbán’s party],” reproaches the co-chair of the Helsinki Committee.
To unblock €16.4 billion ($18.7 billion) in EU funds frozen during Orbán’s tenure, Parliament on Tuesday approved measures on transparency and anti-corruption. Among other steps, requirements for asset declarations by political representatives have been tightened, with the obligation extended to other senior officials as well as family members living with them. Penalties for false declarations have also been stiffened and now even include potential prison sentences.
The legislation dissolves the private foundations created to manage universities and returns to the state the assets that were transferred to them. It also removes the heads of public media and the Media Council, and creates an independent financial supervisory body.
Between 8% and 10% of GDP
The fight against corruption is one of Magyar’s main banners. According to the prime minister, the operations of the “mafia” formed by the political and economic elite close to Orbán have cost the country between 8% and 10% of GDP. The constitutional reform proposes the creation of a National Office for the Recovery and Protection of State Assets. Establishing this body, which will operate independently from the executive and be accountable to Parliament, requires amendments to 47 laws, local media report.
The measures proposed at the start of a legislative term aimed at bringing about a regime change enjoy broad support among much of Hungarian society, although some of the methods have sparked debate among experts. Both Pardavi and Demeter welcome the progress of this new Hungary, which this Saturday is hosting an LGBTQ+ Pride parade with the backing of the authorities — something unthinkable in the Orbán era.
However, they lament continuity in the area of migration. “They are using the same terms and discursive frameworks about migrants and asylum seekers that the previous government used, and that is horrible,” Demeter says.
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