U.S. journalist and historian Stephen Kinzer, 74, has devoted much of his work to analyzing a century of U.S.-backed government overthrows around the world: from Hawaii to Iraq, examining the pattern of military intervention and exposing its long-term consequences. A former correspondent for The New York Times, Kinzer has established himself as one of the most vocal critics of U.S. interventionism.
In his book All the Shah’s Men, the journalist reconstructs the 1953 coup orchestrated by the CIA and MI6 — the U.S. and British intelligence services — against Iran’s democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, after Mossadegh declared he wanted to nationalize Iranian oil, and shows how that upheaval shaped the future of Iran up to the current conflict. Kinzer discusses the present situation in a phone interview.
Question. U.S. President Donald Trump has cited various reasons — such as the need for regime change, the threat of nuclear weapons, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz — to attack Iran. What do you think the real objective is?
Answer. What ties together the countries and the targets of the United States, including Iran, is really simple: defiance. These are all countries that defy U.S. policies. They refuse to establish governments that respond to what Washington wants. Sometimes we hear from Washington — [Joe] Biden used to say this — the age of spheres of influence is over. But that is disingenuous. In fact, the United States considers the entire world to be its justified sphere of influence, outside of China, Russia, and a couple of other countries. And it is precisely those countries that end up becoming our targets.
Q. Venezuela falls into the same pattern. But perhaps the difference with Iran is that this is a joint attack with Israel. How much of this decision was made in Washington and how much in Israel?
A. It seems clear that we would not have launched this attack without the support of Israel. It’s almost a cliché to say that Israel has a remarkable influence on our national politics. One single supporter of Israel, Ariel Adelson, gave [Trump’s campaign] $100 million. In a sense, this attack has been years in the making. Israel has created the image of Iran as an imminent threat, and while Israel’s security concerns may be legitimate, it’s not a reason to drag the United States into this war. Without Israel cheerleading for it, I doubt it would have happened.
Q. In your book All the Shah’s Men, you write about the importance of differing perceptions of the same event. To what extent can disinformation and narratives amplified on social media change events or be used as a tool to promote regime change in new global conflicts?
A. To launch long-term interventions, it’s important to persuade with opinion. I don’t think that’s happened with this Iran operation. I don’t believe most Americans are enthusiastic about it, and I’m not sure it’s going to be to Trump’s political benefit. I think the opposite is more likely. In the American view, U.S.-Iran relations begin and end with the 1979 hostage crisis [the 52 U.S. citizens seized at the U.S. embassy in Tehran for 444 days by Islamist students, which led to the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries that remains in place]. We see that as an outburst of savagery that just shows how nihilistic and barbaric the Iranians are.
Iranians see history very differently. For them, the hostage crisis cannot be separated from the 1953 coup [against prime minister Mossadegh]. From their perspective, they were on the road to creating a democracy, and the United States intervened to make that impossible. Everything that has followed since then is a result of that intervention.
Q. What lessons can be drawn today from that coup?
A. In 1953, the United States intervened to overthrow the only democracy Iran ever had. Since then, Iran has never gotten back to any form of democracy. What it shows you is that violently intervening in the politics of another country can have very unpredictable results, including results that boomerang back against you.
What were the results of the 1953 coup? In the short run, it looked great. We got rid of a leader we didn’t like, Mossadegh, and we replaced him with someone, the Shah, who would do whatever we wanted. It seemed like the perfect solution, but that’s only perfect if history stops. Unfortunately, history keeps on unfolding. The Shah ruled with increasing repression for 25 years. That repression led to the explosion of the late 1970s, the Islamic Revolution, and placed in power a group of fanatically anti-American militants who have spent decades trying intently and sometimes very violently to undermine American interests all over the world.
The 1953 coup was devastating not only for Iran, but in the long run, it greatly damaged our own national security interests. The moral is that when you violently intervene in the affairs of another country, you’re doing something like releasing a wheel at the top of a hill. You can let it go, but you have no control over how it bounces or where it ends up.
Q. Are there really options to reinstate the Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi in Iran?
A. In 1953, the Shah participated in a coup organized by the CIA and the British secret service. The coup failed, and the Shah fled Iran. He went to Iraq, and then he landed in Rome. There, he told people that he expected he’d have to get a job in Rome because he didn’t think he could return to Iran. The CIA officer in charge of the operation, Kermit Roosevelt, decided to try a second time, and the second attempt succeeded. What happened then was that we placed the Shah back on the throne.
The fundamental reason that he was overthrown 25 years later was that he never had legitimacy. And the reason he never had legitimacy was that he had been placed in power by foreign influence. He was never able to get rid of that.
It shows you an important part of the Iranian psyche: the desire for a regime that comes out of Iran. They have been the victims of foreign intervention for 200 years and more, and are very conscious of this. That’s why one of the things they look for in their governments is that they be rooted in Iran. The Shah never was. Any government that comes to power on the back of the United States, if one ever were to, would certainly face that same legitimacy problem and have a lot of trouble establishing itself.
Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition
