OTTAWA — That hot person who reached out on LinkedIn or Indeed to offer you a job that feels “too good to be true”? They may be a Chinese intelligence agent, warns Canada’s spy agency.
In a new advisory with its Five Eyes intelligence sharing partners , the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) sounded the alarm Wednesday on an increasingly popular method for Chinese spies to steal information from Canadians: online hiring websites.
The warning comes as Prime Minister Mark Carney looks to increase trade ties with China and establish a new “strategic partnership” with the Asian economic behemoth after years of diplomatic chill.
“China’s military intelligence is using an increasingly wide array of professional networking sites and online job platforms to target Five Eyes government and military personnel—and anyone with access to classified or privileged information,” reads the advisory.
“Successful candidates are pressured to provide ‘non-public’ information for unspecified clients who are associated with the Chinese government. Chinese military intelligence services ultimately seek to acquire privileged military, political and economic intelligence that can provide China with a strategic and tactical advantage over the Five Eyes,” it continues.
It’s not the first time that CSIS has warned of foreign spies posing as online job recruiters, but the tone and depth of the advisory suggest the scheme is increasingly successful — and problematic for Western governments.
According to the advisory, Chinese spies are looking to covertly recruit people who hold security clearances within their respective governments, military personnel or individuals with “indirect or peripheral” access to government information such as academics, journalists or researchers.
The scheme is simple and yet effective enough for Five Eyes intelligence agencies (Canada, U.S., U.K., Australia and New Zealand) to feel the need to warn their citizens of it.
According to the advisory, Chinese spies pose as recruiters or consultants on websites such as LinkedIn, Indeed or freelance work boards and claim to work for fake “cover companies” based anywhere but China.
Usually, the profile picture shows an attractive individual with a common name who appears to be young but holds an uncharacteristically senior job title, CSIS warned.
They either post jobs looking for individuals with geopolitical, national security or defence expertise, or reach out to such people offering them freelance work.
The job posts or offers are often generic, rife with spelling errors and “too good to be true,” the advisory said. They also offer to pay using unconventional methods such as cryptocurrency and promise more money for “non-public information”, CSIS warned.
After making contact, the recruiters tend to offer an interview where they start probing for information or looking for contacts in sensitive sectors or government. They’ll generally also ask targets to do an initial test report before being told that subsequent reports will require “more privileged information,” which comes with more money.
Though not all targets will have classified information they can share, even unclassified or private information on government is of great interest to Chinese spies, CSIS said.
“While applicants often have no direct access to classified information, even unclassified information on government policy, or on military strategy, capabilities and installations, can be collected and combined with more sensitive reporting to form a comprehensive operational picture,” reads the advisory.
“Certain types of data can place the lives of frontline military or other personnel at risk, can weaken our economic prosperity, and enable interference in our democratic processes.”
National Post
cnardi@postmedia.com
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